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Abstract This paper describes the long-term global trends in education inequality 
since 1870. Inequality in years of schooling is shown to have mechanically decreased 
along with the decline in the share of illiterate people. In search of a monetary 
equivalent of years of schooling, we turn to Mincer (1974) human capital ineq uality. 
Within countries, we find evidence of an inverted U-shape curve for human capital 
inequality over time, namely a Kuznets curve for human capital. At the global 
level, the world inequality in human capital has followed a similar trajectory, first 
increasing from 1870 to 1970, then decreasing.
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1 Introduction
While several studies have described the world distribution of income (e.g.
Bourguignon and Morrisson [5], Milanovic [16], Sala-I-Martin [26]), less attention
has been paid to the global patterns of the underlying factors of production. In
particular, the world distribution of education has never been described over the
long run. A better understanding of global inequality in education is important as
education convergence is a prerequisite for income convergence. Indeed, education
stands as a key factor of production that determines individual workers’ productivity,
drives the pace of technological progress [1] and triggers key externalities such
as the demographic transition [23] or democratization [24]. Besides, education is
recognized to be a crucial dimension of welfare alongside income, health and political
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rights. How the world distribution of education has evolved over time is therefore
informative on global welfare trends.
Against this background, the paper makes mainly three contributions. First,
this study provides estimates of the world distribution of education and of global
inequality in years of schooling from 1870 to 2010. Second, it shows that the large
decrease in years of schooling inequality is the mechanical consequence of the decline
in illiteracy. The third contribution is linked to the search of a monetary equivalent
to education. Using the Mincerian definition of human capital, we estimate the
distribution of human capital within each country and at the global level.
Whereas existing studies such as Castello and Domenech [7] or Thomas et al. [27]
provide a descriptive analysis of inequality in years of schooling both within and
between countries, they do not consider the world distribution of years of schooling
regardless of country borders. After summarizing the distribution of education
by four quantiles (no schooling, only primary schooling, primary and secondary
schooling, higher education) in each country, we obtain a distribution of 128 groups
(4 quantiles × 32 large countries) forming the world distribution of years of school-
ing, and allowing the estimation of schooling global inequality.
Moreover, the cross-country negative correlation between the average of and the
inequality in years of schooling has been underlined in several articles (e.g. Castello
and Domenech [7], Berthelemy [3]). We complement the latter studies by showing
that the observed decline in years of schooling inequality since 1870 is almost entirely
explained by the decline in illiteracy, and we provide the theoretical explanation of
this relationship.
Last, in line with recent macroeconomic literature (e.g. Bils and Klenow [4],
Hall and Jones [11]), we turn to human capital as defined by Mincer [17] to confer
a monetary dimension to education. We propose the first estimation of global
inequality in human capital, while testing several definitions of human capital. At the
national level, we find that human capital inequality has increased within countries,
before stabilizing or even decreasing in most regions of the world. When plotted
against average human capital, human capital within-country inequality has followed
an inverted U-shape curve, namely a “Kuznets curve of human capital inequality”.
However, the decrease in human capital inequality is less pronounced when returns
to education are assumed to increase with schooling attainment. At the global level,
we also find that human capital inequality has increased from 1870 to approximately
1970, and has decreased afterwards.
Section 2 introduces the methodology and the data. Section 3 examines the
world distribution of education since 1870. Section 4 focuses on global inequality in
education, while Section 5 looks at global inequality in human capital. In Section 6,
we describe human capital inequality within countries, while last section concludes.
2 Methodology and data
This section describes the geographical coverage of the data, the construction of
national distributions of education, and the computation of global inequality in
education.
The definition of countries or geographical areas follows Bourguignon and
Morrisson [5], who have selected a sample of large countries and merged countries
of smaller size. Interestingly, having the same sample of ‘macro-countries’ as the
latter authors enables a comparison of education and income inequalities. For GDP
per capita and population, we updated the data from these authors using the last
estimates from Maddison [14]. Country-level data have been averaged to obtain
a final sample of 32 macro-countries, which correspond to at least 90% of world
population at any period.1 Each country or country group represents at least 1 per
cent of world population or world GDP in 1950. In order to facilitate the presentation
of the results, these macro-countries have been aggregated into eight blocks defined
geographically, historically or economically: Africa; Latin America excluding Argen-
tine and Chile; Eastern Europe; Western Europe (including Austria, Czechoslovakia
and Hungary) and its offshoots in America (Argentina, Chile, Canada and the US)
and in the Pacific (Australia and New-Zealand); China; India (including Bangladesh
and Pakistan); Japan and Korea; other Asian countries.
The construction of national distributions of education proceeds in two steps.
First, we have improved the education database published by Morrisson and Murtin
[19].2 We took into account differential mortality across educational groups to
correct the distributions of schooling after 1960, and we refined the US series
by taking into account immigration in this country over the 19th and early 20th
centuries, while drawing from Murtin and Viarengo [21].
On a second step, we calculated the distribution of education in each country. It is
summarized by four groups, namely the percentage pP of the population displaying
only primary schooling, the percentage pS of the population displaying primary
and secondary schooling, the percentage pH of the population displaying primary,
secondary and tertiary schooling, and the complementary part, the percentage pI of
the population that has not attended school. These percentages are inferred from the
knowledge of average years HP,S,H of primary, secondary and tertiary schooling, as
well as from assumptions on the average durations at school hP,S,H in each grade.3
The national distributions of schooling are given by the following formulas:
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
HP = hP pP + 6 (pS + pH)
HS = hS pS + 6 pH
HH = hH pH
pP + pS + pH + pI = 1
(1)
1Bourguignon and Morrisson [5] have 33 macro-countries as Poland is included within their sample
but not in ours.
2It can be downloaded from the website www.fabricemurtin.com together with a companion annex
describing data construction in greater details. Morrisson and Murtin [19] data set is based on
Cohen and Soto [8] for the period 1960–2010, while estimates of average years of schooling have
been calculated via perpetual inventory for the period 1870–1960, using data on total enrollments in
primary, secondary and higher education since the early 19th century as well as age pyramids. The
latter data is available from the work of Mitchell, an historian who published thousands of historical
time series covering the 19th and 20th centuries in many countries.
3We consider different repeating and dropout rates across countries and time as in Morrisson and
Murtin [19], which reflect, at least to some extent, international differences in education quality.
Obviously, this is only a partial account of the existing heterogeneity in education quality as measured
for instance by PISA studies. Nonetheless, the latter studies started only in 1997. In practice, we have
assumed that completed primary was lasting a maximum of six years and tertiary a maximum of four
years. These assumptions ensure comparability across time and countries of education distributions,
in spite of the many international reforms of schooling systems over that period.
Moreover, we have cross-checked the above estimates of the percentage of non-
educated population pI with a historical database on illiteracy rates that contains
179 observations mainly taken from UNESCO [28] and spanning over the 1870–1950
period. Although we do not expect rates of illiteracy and of school non-attendance
to match perfectly as pupils who have attended school for a few years could still
be technically illiterate, while people who have never attended school could have
received some literacy within their household or at some unreported church-based
school, we expect a high level of correlation between the two variables. As a result,
this correlation is equal to 0.98 and there is no significant outlier, which suggests a
satisfactory degree of data reliability.4
The world distribution of education is then obtained as follows. The unit of
analysis is a given group of education (people with no schooling, with only primary,
with primary and secondary, with primary, secondary and tertiary schooling) in a
given country, implying a world distribution of education composed of 4 groups
× 32 macro-countries = 128 groups. Each group is characterized by its share
pP,S,Hi of national population and its average number of years of education h
P,S,H .
Accordingly, all groups are pooled across countries and are ranked according to their
level of schooling, and then the Lorenz curve is computed while weighting each
group by national population. We assumed no heterogeneity in years of schooling
within each group. As reported in the companion annex (cf. n. 2 with reference to
our website www.fabricemurtin.com), introducing heterogeneity within groups raises
slightly the level of world education inequality, but does not modify the observed
trends and leaves the main conclusions of the paper largely unchanged.
3 Global trends in educational attainment since 1870
Table 1 presents the distribution of years of schooling at the world level since 1870.
In the mid-twentieth century, the world was divided into two classes: Those who
have attended school, and those who have not. Over the whole period, there has
been a huge reversal, as illiterates and educated individuals are roughly in inverse
proportions in 1870 and in 2010. What explains this result is clearly the development
of primary schooling, whose attendance involved 24% of the world population in
1870 and 82% in 2010. Moreover, 45% of the world population attended secondary
education in 2010, but this development is quite recent since this proportion was
about 20% in 1960. In a sense, higher education is the contemporary equivalent of
secondary schooling in 1930: 11% of the world population attained higher education
in 2010, whereas the population with at least secondary schooling represented 10% of
world population in 1930. Overall, the average level of schooling has been multiplied
by 6, this increase being unequally spread over the period. Indeed, the absolute
increase was less than 3 average years of schooling between 1870 and 1960, but has
been equal to 3.5 years over the last fifty years.
The global rise in schooling attainment has been unequally distributed across
countries. Table 2 provides a geographical overview of educational attainment
broken down in its underlying components (illiteracy, primary, secondary and ter-
tiary schooling). There were three distinct groups in 1870. In Western Europe and
4This database is now routinely used by the OECD.
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offshoots, average schooling exceeded 3 years. In Latin America, Eastern Europe,
Japan, Korea and China, it was comprised between 0.6 and 1 year. In Africa, South
Asia (India, Bangladesh and Pakistan) and other Asian countries, average schooling
was less than 0.15 years. The illiteracy rate was about 36% in the first group, 80% in
the second one, and above 95% in the third one. These figures highlight the huge gap
between Western Europe and the rest of the world.5
In 2010, the group of less advanced countries is only composed of Africa and
South Asia, because average schooling in other Asian countries has increased much
more than in India, Bangladesh and Pakistan. In contrast, Japan and Korea, as well
as Eastern Europe to a lesser extent, have caught up with Western Europe. In the
intermediate group, we find Latin America, China, and other Asian countries with
average schooling around 8 years. The difference between Western Europe and this
group are about five average years of schooling, which can be roughly decomposed
into one year of primary schooling, three years of secondary schooling, and one
year of higher education. Figure 1 illustrates clearly the process at work across
geographical areas. It is striking that no global convergence in average educational
levels has been observed in the postwar period. Illiteracy, which was a common rule
in 1870 with rates exceeding 80% everywhere except in Western Europe, is now a
regional problem. It remains substantial only in Sub-Saharan Africa and in South
Asia with rates around 36% in 2010.
Changes in the world distribution of education since 1870 are described by Table 3,
which displays the regional composition of three world quantiles, namely the bottom
60%, an intermediate group composed of the 7th, 8th and 9th deciles, as well as
the 10th decile (the first line indicating the share in world population). The main
factors explaining the time variations are the differences in the growth rates of
average education and of population.6 Most of the time, the shares of each group
of countries in the world distributions of education and income are often similar in
a given year, which is not surprising as schooling and income are highly correlated
across countries. However, there are a few interesting exceptions.
Between 1870 and 1910, the respective shares of Africa, South Asia and other
Asian countries in the upper deciles (7th–10th) of the world distribution of education
have been very low compared with their respective shares in income. On the
contrary, these shares have been much higher for schooling than for income in China,
and to some extent in Japan and Korea. From that perspective, the current gap in
economic development between Africa and China is not new. In 1870, nearly all
African population was illiterate, except the Arab population in Northern Africa,
whereas in Asia nearly 40% of Chinese and Japanese men could read and write.
5China and Japan were ahead of other Asian countries, the Indian empire and Africa, with about
one year of schooling (education was higher in Japan than in Korea). This means that around 40%
of men and 10% of women could read and write 3000 graphic signs, which requires about 4 years
of schooling. A small minority knew several thousand signs after 6 or 8 years of schooling. As the
average educational attainment in China and Japan was approximatively the same at the beginning
of the eighteenth century, these countries were the only ones in the world that had the same average
schooling than Western Europe three centuries ago.
6For instance, the shares in world population of Latin America and Africa respectively, have been
multiplied by 3 and 2 between 1870 and 2000, whereas the shares of Western Europe and Eastern
Europe have decreased.
Table 2 Mean years of schooling and illiteracy rate by geographical area 1870–2010
Africa Latin Eastern Europe China Japan– South Other
America Europe and Korea Asia Asian
offshoots countries
1870
Total MYS 0.12 0.63 0.94 3.81 1.01 1.00 0.08 0.14
Primary 0.11 0.53 0.84 2.89 0.91 0.98 0.08 0.11
Secondary 0.01 0.09 0.10 0.90 0.09 0.02 0.00 0.02
Illiteracy rate 97.52 86.47 77.62 36.36 75.16 79.77 98.08 97.17
Population 66.0 32.4 94.9 229.5 358.0 44.2 257.6 72.9
(in millions)
1910
Total MYS 0.24 1.31 1.40 6.04 1.21 2.61 0.37 0.28
Primary 0.21 1.06 1.24 4.41 1.10 2.52 0.30 0.24
Secondary 0.02 0.24 0.16 1.56 0.10 0.08 0.07 0.04
Illiteracy rate 95.13 73.37 67.26 13.11 69.86 47.95 93.42 94.01
Population 96.2 64.0 148.9 349.3 423.0 59.6 305.0 109.5
(in millions)
1950
Total MYS 0.82 2.99 5.04 7.93 1.69 6.02 1.16 1.25
Primary 0.68 2.36 4.07 5.35 1.45 4.66 0.87 1.01
Secondary 0.14 0.59 0.86 2.41 0.21 1.25 0.26 0.22
Illiteracy rate 86.46 45.72 2.44 5.20 61.19 15.88 82.70 76.29
Population 175.9 140.2 194.4 482.0 546.8 104.7 444.1 192.3
(in millions)
1980
Total MYS 2.30 5.37 9.02 10.88 4.63 10.45 2.61 4.07
Primary 1.72 3.99 5.69 5.89 3.82 5.77 1.73 3.23
Secondary 0.54 1.20 3.01 4.35 0.78 4.31 0.79 0.76
Illiteracy rate 67.25 28.42 1.15 0.88 31.44 2.96 68.08 39.86
Population 366.9 309.4 284.5 636.6 981.2 154.9 852.2 399.2
(in millions)
2010
Total MYS 4.81 8.17 9.76 12.71 7.69 13.11 4.96 7.51
Primary 3.43 5.31 5.81 5.97 5.07 5.99 3.35 5.14
Secondary 1.26 2.48 3.50 5.41 2.43 5.91 1.38 2.10
Illiteracy rate 34.21 6.35 0.06 0.10 11.58 0.00 37.67 8.14
Population 772.1 504.4 297.9 769.2 1339.0 175.8 1509.8 676.3
(in millions)
Furthermore, the share of Western Europe in the education top decile was equal
to 60% in 1870, nearly the same amount as its share in the income top decile. If
we consider that secondary schooling was the condition of access to technology, in
1910, Western Europe had in some respect the quasi-monopoly of knowledge and
technology. Today this monopoly has disappeared. The share of Western Europe
in the education top decile is only 40% in 2010 instead of 61% for income.7 In
7The share of Western Europe among world’s top income is the same as in 1870, whereas the share
in world’s top education has sharply receded since 1910. So Western Europe has kept an important
advantage in world income distribution in spite of losing its leadership on top education.
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Fig. 1 Average years of schooling by region 1870–2010
comparison, the share of Asia (including China, Japan, Korea, South Asia) in the
top decile has increased from 26% in 1910 to 41% in 2010.
4 Inequality in years of schooling
In this section we analyse global inequality in years of schooling as measured by
the coefficient of variation, the Gini and the Theil indices,8 and we compare it with
global income inequality. Table 4 shows an exceptionally high level of inequality in
1870 with a Gini coefficient reaching 0.82 and a Theil index of 1.56, a much higher
inequality level than for the income distribution (0.56 for the Gini and 0.67 for the
Theil). However, income and education inequality have displayed opposite trends
since 1870. Inequality in years of schooling has decreased continuously and rapidly as
the Gini coefficient has been divided by more than two and the Theil index amounts
today to less than one fifth of its original level. This massive decline in inequality can
largely be explained by the long-run decline in illiteracy (see below). On the contrary,
income inequality has increased until 1990, reaching 0.65 (Gini) and 0.82 (Theil) at
that date. After 1990, global inequality in schooling and global income inequality
have both receded.
It is meaningful to draw a comparison between illiteracy and extreme poverty (less
than 1 dollar a day). Between 1870 and 1990, the world illiteracy rate has decreased
from 76% to 27% and extreme poverty from 75% to 24%. Therefore, the downward
8The mean logarithmic deviation was not reported since it is only defined over strictly positive
outcomes.
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Table 4 Global inequality in income and years of schooling
1870 1890 1910 1930 1950 1970 1990 2010
World population—income
Gini coefficient 0.560 0.589 0.612 0.618 0.643 0.652 0.653 0.619
Theil coefficient 0.672 0.749 0.802 0.781 0.812 0.815 0.816 0.722
Theil coefficient between countries 0.189 0.256 0.305 0.372 0.489 0.499 0.544 0.396
Average income 890 1111 1462 1811 2141 3767 5062 7519
World population—years of schooling
Coefficient of variation 2.134 1.850 1.624 1.422 1.246 1.005 0.793 0.664
Gini coefficient 0.818 0.776 0.732 0.683 0.631 0.540 0.439 0.370
Theil coefficient 1.557 1.339 1.151 0.970 0.806 0.588 0.411 0.292
Theil coefficient between countries 0.613 0.597 0.526 0.433 0.335 0.205 0.113 0.067
Average years of schooling 1.24 1.62 2.08 2.60 3.31 4.68 6.29 7.47
Illiteracy rate 75.9 70.1 64.0 56.8 48.7 37.0 27.5 18.3
Educated population
Coefficient of variation 0.582 0.569 0.557 0.554 0.555 0.516 0.424 0.422
Gini coefficient 0.244 0.253 0.257 0.267 0.281 0.270 0.225 0.229
Theil coefficient 0.135 0.133 0.131 0.132 0.138 0.126 0.089 0.090
Average years of schooling 5.13 5.43 5.77 6.02 6.45 7.42 8.68 9.14
trend of these two benchmark indicators, namely the percentages of people who do
not have access to education or to a minimum income, is similar and illustrates an
unprecedented improvement.
Table 4 describes the decomposition of the Theil index into its two sub-
components, namely inequality within and between countries. Regarding schooling,
we observe a rapid decrease in within and between-country inequality over the
period 1870–2010. Concerning income, the between-country Theil index has largely
increased between 1870 and 1990, but it has decreased sharply afterward. This
suggests that the catch-up process between advanced and poor countries has started
in 1870 for schooling but only in 1990 for income.
Similarly, the structure of global inequality has evolved differently for schooling
and income. While the between-country contribution has decreased from 46% in
1910 to only 23% for schooling in 2010,9 it has increased continuously from 28% in
1870 to 66% in 1990 for income (Table 4). Likewise, the gap between the poorest
region—Africa—and Western Europe is only 1–3 for average schooling instead of 1
to 12 for average income.
To explain the observed trend in schooling inequality, we look more closely at the
share of individuals endowed with zero years of schooling.10 As reported in Table 4,
if we exclude the illiteracy group and compute a Gini index on educated individuals
only, we find a Gini equal to 0.24 in 1870, 0.28 in 1950, and 0.23 in 2010. So a sizeable
share of inequality in years of schooling is explained by illiteracy at a given date,
and time variations in schooling inequality reflect mainly illiteracy’s decrease. Some
studies (Castello and Domenech [7], or Berthelemy [3]) have already pointed at
9The latter figure is in agreement with the World Bank [29] estimate (less than 20%).
10Intuitively, if we remember that the Gini index is twice the area situated below the Lorenz curve,
then illiteracy should have a huge impact on this index by shifting away the origin of the curve from
zero to the percentage of illiterates in the population.
the negative correlation between years of schooling inequality and average years of
schooling, offering various explanations. The following proposition shows that there
is a mechanical link between illiteracy and years of schooling inequality (proof in
companion Appendix).
Proposition 1 Let f be the distribution of a random variable X taking values over a
domain [m, M] with 0 ≤ m < +∞ and M ≤ +∞. Assume that this distribution can be
decomposed as the mixture
f (x) = pδx=m + (1 − p)g(x) (2)
where δx=m is a mass point in the minimum value and g the distribution of the
population for which X > m, and p < 1. Let μ( f ) be the mean outcome for a
distribution f , G( f ) the corresponding Gini index, and IαGE( f ) the Generalized-
Entropy index. The Gini index can be decomposed as follows
G( f ) = pμ( f ) − m
μ( f )
+ (1 − p)μ( f ) − pm
μ( f )
G(g)
and similarly for the Generalized-entropy indices IαGE( f ), with α = 011
IαGE( f ) = (1 − p)1−α
(
μ( f ) − pm
μ( f )
)α
IαGE(g)
+ 1
α2 − α
(
(1 − p)1−α
(
μ( f ) − pm
μ( f )
)α
+ pmαμ( f )−α − 1
)
An application to years of schooling follows immediately. Taking m = 0, the
proposition shows that the Gini index computed over the whole population is a linear
combination of the illiteracy rate and the Gini index computed over the educated
population. Formally, one obtains respectively for the Gini and Theil indices (the
Theil index decomposition is obtained when α → 1):
G( f ) = p + (1 − p)G(g)
Theil( f ) = Theil(g) − ln(1 − p)
The above proposition shows that the decline in illiteracy explains almost all of
the decrease in years of schooling inequality over the period. Indeed, let us assume
that inequality among the educated population remains constant over time and equal
to 0.25, its grand average. According to the latter formula, an illiteracy level of 76%
should set the Gini index calculated over the whole population at a value of 0.82,
while an illiteracy level of 18% would bring it at 0.39. These figures match almost
perfectly the actual values of the Gini index calculated over the whole population
(0.82 in 1870 and 0.37 in 2010), showing that virtually all of the decrease in the
Gini index between 1870 and 2010 is explained by illiteracy’s decline. Consequently,
the cross-country negative correlation between average schooling and schooling
inequality depicted in the literature simply reflects the negative correlation between
average schooling and illiteracy, which is mechanical.
11The proposition is still valid for the Mean Logarithmic Index, i.e. when α = 0, if m > 0.
Last and most importantly, inequality indices have been originally constructed for
monetary outcomes, but years of schooling do not have such a monetary dimension.
A crucial issue in the measurement of education inequality is therefore the search of
an equivalence scale for years of schooling. Focusing on human capital is one solution
to that problem, which is described in the next section.
5 Inequality in human capital
5.1 Defining human capital
The macroeconomic literature has gradually moved away from considering average
years of schooling as a factor of production as in Mankiw et al. [15], to focus on the
Mincerian definition of human capital as proposed by Bils and Klenow [4] and Hall
and Jones [11]. For an educational group j in a country i at date t let us define human
capital hi, j,t as:
hi, j,t = eri, j,t Si, j,t
where Si, j,t is average years of schooling of group j and ri, j,t the return to schooling.
As a convenient starting point, we rule out heterogeneity in the return to schooling
across time, countries and groups,12 assuming ri,t = r = 0.1 ∀ i, j, t. The 10% value is
the average world return to schooling arising from the study by Psacharopoulos and
Patrinos [25].
As a second step, we argue that the return to schooling declines with the level of
educational attainment. In other words, schooling has diminishing returns. As argued
by Psacharopoulos and Patrinos [25], the returns to schooling may be higher for
primary schooling than for secondary or higher education, although other studies do
not fully share the same conclusion (e.g. Duflo [10]). Interestingly, there is evidence
of diminishing returns to education in one country over a long period of time (the US
between 1940 and 1980, see Murtin and Viarengo [22]). At the cross-country level,
the negative correlation between Mincer returns to education and average years of
schooling that is reported in Psacharopoulos and Patrinos [25] can be seen as a direct
consequence of diminishing returns to schooling.13 Using the coefficients estimated
from the cross-country regression of average Mincer returns on average years of
schooling, we obtain the following benchmark definition of human capital for the
educational group j in country i at time t:
hi, j,t = e0.1254Si, j,t−0.002S2i, j,t (3)
from which average human capital in country i can be calculated by averaging over
all educational groups.
12We also rule out any externality of education.
13As explained by Mincer [17] and Card [6], diminishing returns to schooling can be captured by
a quadratic function of schooling in the regression log yi, j,t = a + ρSi, j,t − 12 kS2i, j,t + ui,t, where y is
income and (i, j, t) denote respectively country, educational group and time. Once the above equation
is derived with respect to schooling, one obtains the following return to schooling ri, j,t = ρ − kSi, j,t,
which leads to a negative linear relationship between the average Mincer return to schooling and
average years of schooling at the cross-country level.
However, recent studies (e.g. Colclough et al. [9]) have contradicted the above
evidence as they have found increasing rather than decreasing returns to education in
the recent past. The choice of a particular functional form for the returns to education
is important because the rest of the paper relies on it. So we have examined another
definition of human capital displaying increasing returns to education:
hi, j,t = e0.0088.Si, j,t+0.0055.S2i, j,t (4)
This functional form implies returns to schooling that are close from those described
by Colclough et al. [9]. Indeed, the return to primary (respectively secondary and
tertiary) schooling is equal to 7.5% (resp. 14.1% and 18.5%), while the latter authors
mention 7.4% (resp. 11.0% and 19.8%). With the two latter functional forms,
increasing and decreasing returns to education are both equal to 9.5% when average
years of education amounts to 7.8 years.
5.2 Results
Table 5 provides estimates of human capital inequality for these three specifications
(r = 10%, Mincerian diminishing then increasing returns). The contrast between
schooling and human capital inequality is striking, as their trends appear to be oppo-
site until the second half of the 20th century. Indeed, whereas schooling inequality
has always decreased, the Gini index of human capital inequality has increased
by respectively 0.14 points (r = 0.10), 0.08 points (diminishing returns) and 0.30
points (increasing returns) between 1870 and 1970. After 1970, we find that human
capital inequality has fallen over time in the simulations with constant and decreasing
returns. Inequality keeps on increasing until 1990 in the simulation with increasing
returns, then stabilizes (Gini index) or decreases (all other inequality indices). It
is striking that increasing returns to education generate much more human capital
inequality.
Overall, global human capital inequality has followed an inverted U-shape curve
that has peaked somewhere in the second half of the 20th century, then has started
falling. This closely mirrors the result brought forward by Morrisson and Murtin
[20], who estimate that income inequality between countries has started decreasing
in the 1990s and may keep on falling in the forthcoming years due to conditional
convergence effects.
The initial increase in human capital inequality cannot be reconciled so easily
with declining schooling inequality and constant or decreasing returns to education.
To explain this apparent paradox, let us assume that schooling S has a normal
distribution with mean m and coefficient of variation s. Laplace transformation of
a normal variable simply provides the coefficient of variation of human capital s(h)
and a first-order approximation yields
s (h) = Var(e
rS)1/2
E(erS)
=
√
er2m2s2 − 1  rms (5)
where r stands for the return to schooling. Now it becomes clear that human
capital inequality depends positively on inequality in years of schooling (s), pos-
itively on the return to education (r), but also positively on the average level of
schooling (m): Due to the convexity of the exponential function, a given level
of schooling inequality (as measured by the coefficient of variation) is trans-
Table 5 Global inequality in human capital
1870 1890 1910 1930 1950 1970 1990 2010
World population
Constant return equal to 10%
Coefficient of variation 0.39 0.43 0.47 0.50 0.53 0.54 0.52 0.49
Gini coefficient 0.131 0.159 0.188 0.212 0.241 0.272 0.273 0.264
Theil coefficient 0.057 0.070 0.085 0.097 0.113 0.129 0.124 0.115
Theil coefficient between countries 0.019 0.029 0.040 0.046 0.049 0.052 0.044 0.034
Average human capital 1.18 1.25 1.32 1.41 1.54 1.80 2.13 2.38
Human capital with diminishing returns
Coefficient of variation 0.30 0.32 0.34 0.35 0.36 0.36 0.33 0.30
Gini coefficient 0.116 0.138 0.157 0.173 0.188 0.197 0.184 0.164
Theil coefficient 0.037 0.044 0.051 0.056 0.061 0.064 0.058 0.047
Theil coefficient between countries 0.014 0.021 0.026 0.029 0.030 0.027 0.020 0.013
Average human capital 1.17 1.22 1.28 1.35 1.44 1.61 1.81 1.95
Human capital with increasing returns
Coefficient of variation 0.85 0.92 1.09 1.19 1.31 1.33 1.25 1.18
Gini coefficient 0.168 0.212 0.269 0.321 0.390 0.469 0.501 0.509
Theil coefficient 0.158 0.197 0.268 0.327 0.414 0.493 0.504 0.493
Theil coefficient between countries 0.035 0.056 0.089 0.110 0.122 0.150 0.159 0.136
Average human capital 1.22 1.31 1.44 1.59 1.87 2.50 3.37 4.20
Educated population
Constant return equal to 10%
Coefficient of variation 0.39 0.39 0.40 0.41 0.42 0.42 0.39 0.39
Gini coefficient 0.154 0.164 0.174 0.185 0.202 0.214 0.202 0.209
Theil coefficient 0.062 0.064 0.067 0.071 0.078 0.082 0.072 0.075
Theil coefficient between countries 0.007 0.009 0.014 0.018 0.018 0.023 0.019 0.018
Average human capital 1.76 1.82 1.89 1.95 2.05 2.27 2.56 2.69
Human capital with diminishing returns
Coefficient of variation 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.23 0.22 0.19 0.19
Gini coefficient 0.094 0.100 0.104 0.110 0.119 0.118 0.099 0.101
Theil coefficient 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.023 0.025 0.025 0.018 0.018
Theil coefficient between countries 0.003 0.004 0.006 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.005 0.004
Average human capital 1.69 1.72 1.77 1.80 1.85 1.97 2.12 2.16
Human capital with increasing returns
Coefficient of variation 1.01 1.00 1.10 1.14 1.18 1.16 1.09 1.06
Gini coefficient 0.325 0.339 0.370 0.393 0.430 0.460 0.463 0.474
Theil coefficient 0.292 0.295 0.341 0.368 0.413 0.435 0.420 0.425
Theil coefficient between countries 0.025 0.032 0.053 0.068 0.062 0.090 0.100 0.097
Average human capital 1.92 2.03 2.22 2.37 2.70 3.39 4.26 4.89
formed into larger human capital inequality as the average level of schooling is
rising.14 Initially, this convexity effect has overcome the equalitarian effect in-
duced by a more equal distribution of years of schooling. On a second step,
14For instance, with r = 0.1, a s = 10% variation in schooling represents a s(h) = 0.1 × 0.1 = 1%
variation in human capital when m = 1, and a 0.1 × 0.1 × 10 = 10% variation in human capital when
m = 10.
the equalitarian effect has dominated and inequality in human capital has started
decreasing.15
Some limitations of the above framework deserve a quick discussion. First, we
have ruled out country-specific returns.16 Indeed, the goal of the paper is to propose a
general framework where education is rescaled along a monetary dimension over 140
years. Second, empirical studies generally use Mincer regressions in the context of
wage-earner income. However, wage-earners do not necessarily constitute the bulk
of the active population in developing countries. In a sense, it is not certain that our
simplistic Mincerian framework would be appropriate to depict the labour market in
rural areas. As underlined by Banerjee and Duflo [2], many market failures affect
very poor populations, so that marginal productivity and wages do not necessarily
match over such imperfect markets (such as those having prevailed among socialist
countries). From that perspective, our scale of equivalence in years of schooling does
not reflect actual human capital (income), but rather potential human capital in a
counter-factual, well-functionning, labour market.
So far, the findings of the paper are as follows: (i) inequality in years of schooling
has declined dramatically because of illiteracy’s decline; and (ii) human capital global
inequality has increased during approximatively one century, namely between 1870
and 1970–1990, then has started decreasing. In the next section, we analyse the trends
of human capital inequality within countries.
6 The Kuznets curve of human capital
Figure 2 displays the regional average of human capital inequality within countries,
using the eight geographical areas described earlier and constant returns to educa-
tion.17 Several facts emerge. First, Western Europe and offshoots are the only region
in the world where human capital inequality within countries has been continuously
falling since 1870. In all other regions, inequality has increased sharply at least until
the mid-20th century. Second, in all regions of the world, human capital within-
country inequality has stagnated or has started decreasing in the second half of the
20th century. The timing of that reversal in trends varies across regions. In Japan
and Korea, it took place around 1950, around 1970 in Eastern Europe and after
1980 in Latin America, Africa and Other Asian Countries. Human capital inequality
has stagnated within China, India, Bangladesh and Pakistan since 1980, and one can
expect such a decrease to take place in a close future.
These patterns deeply echo with the well-known Kuznets [12] hypothesis of an
inverted U-shaped curve for income inequality within countries. Kuznets argued
that, among other causes, sectoral shifts of workers would entail rising income
inequality in first place, but a declining trend afterward. This hypothesis has received
15Decreasing returns to education reinforce the equalitarian effect while increasing returns to
education diminish it.
16Actually, we have tested the effect of introducing country-specific, autocorrelated, shocks on the
return to schooling, while running a bootstrap experiment. All results were qualitatively unchanged.
17Although national distributions of education are composed of only 4 groups, the resulting level of
national human capital inequality is robust to mis-measurement in educational attainment as shown
in the companion Appendix.
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Fig. 3 The Kuznets curve of human capital 1870–2010—Theil index
much attention in the empirical literature and is discussed by Lindert [13] and
Morrisson [18] from a historical perspective. In our setting, a similar hypothesis
would state that human capital inequality within countries has followed an inverted
U-shape curve along educational development.
Figure 3 plots human capital within-country inequality with respect to average
human capital for the 32 macro-countries over the period 1870–2010, while selecting
decreasing or increasing returns to education. years of schooling. With decreasing
returns to education, we find strong evidence of a “Kuznets curve of human capital
inequality” over the period 1870–2010. Actually, human capital inequality culmi-
nates when countries reach a level of about 3–4 average years of schooling, which
roughly corresponds to half of the population being illiterate, 40% receiving primary
schooling and 10% secondary schooling (e.g. the world around 1950). It is fairly
intuitive that human capital inequality is maximal when the transition from illiteracy
to literacy is exactly at mid-course. This is actually what we observe.
With increasing returns to education, the inverted U-shape pattern is still there,
but it is logically less pronounced as larger returns to higher education generate
more inequality in advanced economies situated on the right tail of the curve, which
is rather flat than declining above 5 units of human capital. Still, we do observe a
higher inequality level (about 0.4 points of Theil) in the range of 2–3 units of human
capital compared to that observed beyond 3 units (about 0.25 points of Theil). This
suggests that the Kuznets curve of human capital inequality is robust to the existence
of increasing returns to education, although the associated effect has a much lower
magnitude.
7 Conclusion
This paper presents the first estimates of the world distribution of years of schooling
and of human capital over the last 140 years. An original database on average years
of schooling and the distributions of schooling has been built for that purpose, ex-
tending past work by Morrisson and Murtin [19]. We have shown that the educational
comparative advantage of Western Europe has decreased rapidly since the beginning
of the twentieth century. As a consequence the contexts of the two globalization
processes, the first in 1860–1914, the second starting in the late 1970s, are very
different. In world economic competition, education is a crucial advantage at least
because it enables access to technological progress. Today, there is a discrepancy
between the lead of Western Europe in the world income distribution and its weight
in world education, whereas Asia has increased its educational share substantially
over the 20th century.
Furthermore, we have shown theoretically that inequality in years of schooling is a
linear function of the illiteracy rate, whose time variation largely dominates the time
variation of schooling inequality among educated people. To solve that problem,
we have introduced human capital inequality, while using alternatively constant,
decreasing or increasing returns to education. As a result, we find that world human
capital inequality has increased, peaked in the second half of the 20th century, then
started decreasing.
One of the major empirical finding of this paper takes place at the country
level. We have exhibited an inverted-U shape curve of human capital inequality
within countries along the process of educational development, namely “a Kuznets
curve of human capital inequality”. It happens that human capital within inequality
is maximal when the share of illiterate population is close to 50% of national
population, an observation that fits well with Kuznets’ original motivation of his
hypothesis. However, the potential existence of increasing returns to education may
mitigate the equalitarian effect associated with the homogeneization of schooling
attainment within countries.
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